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Abstract
Recent epistemology of modality has seen a growing trend towards metaphysics-first
approaches. Contrastingly, this paper offers a more philosophically modest account of
justifying modal claims, focusing on the practices of scientific modal inferences. Two
ways of making such inferences are identified and analyzed: actualist-manipulationist
modality (AM) and relative modality (RM). In AM, what is observed to be or not to be
the case in actuality or under manipulations, allows us to make modal inferences. AM-
based inferences are fallible, but the same holds for practically all empirical inquiry.
In RM, modal inferences are evaluated relative to what is kept fixed in a system, like a
theory or a model. RM-based inferences are more certain but framework-dependent.
While elements from both AM and RM can be found in some existing accounts of
modality, it is worth highlighting them in their own right and isolating their features
for closer scrutiny. This helps to establish their relevant epistemologies that are free
from some strong philosophical assumptions often attached to them in the literature.
We close by showing how combining these two routes amounts to a view that accounts
for a rich variety of modal inferences in science.
Keywords Epistemology of modality · Possibility · Necessity · Scientific inference ·
Relative modality · Manipulation
1 Introduction
The epistemology of modality
1
has been one of the prevailing themes in contempo-
rary philosophy (see, e.g., Fischer & Leon, 2017; Divers, 2002; Hale, 2013; Mallozzi,
1The epistemology of modality is often called “modal epistemology” (see, e.g., Fischer & Leon, 2017).
However, we only use the expression “the epistemology of modality” because “modal epistemology” also
refers to a branch of epistemology that analyses epistemic concepts in modal terms.
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2021b; Williamson, 2007). By observing the actual world, how can we justify infer-
ences about what is possible, necessary, contingent, or impossible? It is often thought
that a satisfactory account of modal knowledge requires making non-trivial—usually
metaphysical—commitments. But the next question is, of course, how can we justify
those? Many existing accounts of modality face considerable challenges, and there is
a huge dissent among philosophers on which, if any, of them is the right one.
The purpose of this paper is to offer a more philosophically modest epistemology of
modality that nevertheless gives a satisfactory description of real-lifemodal reasoning.
Contrary to most philosophical accounts of modality, we focus explicitly on modal
claims made in science. Rather than starting with strong philosophical assumptions
(see, e.g., Lewis, 1986; Chalmers, 2002; Lowe, 2012; Hale, 2013; Mallozzi, 2021a;
Kment, 2021a), we feel that the epistemology of modality should benefit from paying
closer attention to the scientific practice of constructing and evaluating modal infer-
ences. The reasons for this are twofold. First, we think science is themost epistemically
successful way of gaining knowledge, and many of the most interesting modal ques-
tions are either scientific (e.g., Marshall, 2008) or importantly tied to scientific results
(e.g., Dennett, 1984). Second, we want an analysis of modality that concerns the kinds
of modal inferences that are actually made in real life and so can be held empirically
accountable. The context of such inferences is often scientific, especially when they
are rigorously scrutinized.
To that end, we are offering a metaphysically modest account of howmodal knowl-
edge is gained that nevertheless gives a satisfactory description of the way modal
beliefs are formulated in science. The aim is not to construct a detailed methodol-
ogy or settle rivalries between particular scientific modal inferences or hypotheses but
rather to appraise the general types of justifying such inferences. While there has been
a recent interest amongst philosophers of science to understand the modal dimension
of inquiry in areas like biology, physics, and scientificmodeling practices (e.g., Grüne-
Yanoff, 2013; Koskinen, 2017; Massimi, 2019; Verreault-Julien, 2019), the aim of this
paper is to provide a more general “all-purpose” epistemology of scientific modality.
This includes especially so-called natural or nomological modalities, but also logical,
epistemic, and possibly other types. We suggest that the picture offered here naturally
extends to ordinary, everyday modal reasoning. However, we do not make demands
for any dedicatedly metaphysical modalities that (perhaps) go beyond what is prac-
ticed in the sciences—the possible handling of any of them by our account should be
considered a happy corollary.
We begin by dissecting the philosophical tradition on the epistemology of modality
by identifying and explicating two means for making justified modal inferences. The
first, a posteriori way that we call actualist-manipulationist modality (AM), is based
on the widely accepted actuality-to-possibility principle (Hanrahan, 2017; Vaidya,
2015). Here, what is observed to be or not to be the case in actuality or under manipu-
lations allows us to make modal inferences. Often such inferences are ampliative. The
inferences thus made are fallible, but the same holds for practically all inferences in
the empirical domain. (For a similar view, see Roca-Royes, 2017.)
The second, a priori way, is founded on the idea of relative modality (RM). In
relative modality, modal inferences are made and evaluated relative to a system S.
Claims contradicting what is accepted, fixed, or implied in a system are impossible
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within that system.Respectively, claims that can be acceptedwithin the systemwithout
contradiction are possible. Necessary claims are such that their negation would cause
a contradiction, and so on. (For related views, see Quine, 1982, p. 121; Melia, 2003,
pp. 15–18; Girle, 2003, pp. 96–97; Fischer, 2016, 2017.)
While elements from both AM and RM can be found in some existing philosophi-
cal accounts of modality, we feel it is worth highlighting them in their own right and
isolating their features for closer scrutiny. This helps us establish their relevant epis-
temologies and free them of some assumptions often attached to them in the literature
that we consider unnecessary. Based on prevalent scientific practice, we then show
that there is an important bridge between these two routes tomakingmodal inferences:
usually, what is kept fixed in a given system, especially in scientific investigation, is
informed by what is discovered earlier through manipulations. Moreover, in scientific
modelling, relative modalities suggest places for future manipulations in the world,
leading to an iterative process of modal reasoning and the refinement of further modal
inferences. Together, this amounts to a view that accounts for a rich variety of modal
inferences in science without the need to commit to strong philosophical doctrines.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the state of the art of the current
epistemology of modality and situates our view in this context. In Sect. 3, we present
a way of making modal inferences in an actualist-manipulationist way (AM), building
on the actuality-to-possibility principle. Section 4 deals with relative modality (RM)
as a way of making modal inferences. Here we show that theoretical knowledge about
modalities can be understood relative to a framework.We also give a way of evaluating
counterfactual claims. The relationship between the two epistemologies of AM and
RM is the topic of Sect. 5. Finally, in the last section, we offer our conclusions.
2 Setting the stage
Recent epistemology of modality has seen a growing trend towards metaphysics-first
approaches. It is worth quoting from the introduction to a recent special issue on the
epistemology of modality in Synthese (Mallozzi, 2021b, p. S1841):
[F]our features [...] largely characterize the latest literature, and the papers in
the present collection in particular: (i) an endorsement of the importance of
essentialism; (ii) a shift to a ‘metaphysics-first’ approach tomodal epistemology;
(iii) a focus on metaphysical modality as opposed to other kinds of modality;
and (iv) a preference for non-uniform modal epistemology.
The present paper goes against this trend—with the possible exception of (iv). But
what does it mean to advocate a “metaphysics-first” epistemology of modality? Or to
focus one’s interest specifically on metaphysical modality?
Non-logical modalities are typically divided into two main categories: objective
and epistemic (Williamson, 2017). While the former concerns objective reality that
is at least in some important sense mind-independent, the latter is explicitly taken
to represent modalities as they pertain to particular epistemic agents with their lim-
ited, sometimes even highly distorted, sets of beliefs. In many ordinary and scientific
cases, the distinction between objective and epistemic modalities is unproblematic.
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Its pragmatic motivation should similarly be easy to appreciate. It is an objective fact
of the world that it is possible for it to snow in London in June. However, this fact
is obviously independent of the beliefs of any particular agent, and it is even quite
easy to imagine how someone might believe that the opposite is true, namely, that it
is impossible for it to snow in London during summer. Perhaps more typically, the
relationship between epistemic and objective modality is the other way around: given
our current limited knowledge, we might think that something is possible, only to find
out later that this is not the case when more information is revealed about the state of
the world.
In philosophical contexts, objective modality is often further divided into natural
(or empirical) and metaphysical modalities. While natural modalities have to do with
the kinds of modal facts that can be revealed by empirical investigation, metaphysical
modalities can go beyond these. The exact division between natural and metaphysical
modalities is far from clear. Indeed, there is substantial dissent among metaphysicians
about the nature and extent of metaphysical modalities (see, e.g., van Inwagen, 1998;
Hale, 2013; Mallozzi, 2021b). Should we identify metaphysical modality with natural
modality, or does it form its own distinct modal sphere?2 Despite its controversial
status, many philosophers have focused mostly on metaphysical modality, often even
in isolation (Williamson, 2017, p. 415).
Many also see in metaphysical theories the key to solving the epistemological
questions concerning modalities. Examples include grounding modal knowledge on
essences (Hale, 2013; Kment, 2021a; Lowe, 2012;Mallozzi, 2021a), being committed
to a formofmodal realism (Lewis, 1986), or truth-indicativemodal imagination (Berto,
2017; Chalmers, 2002, 2010; Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2012; Kung, 2010; Yablo, 1993). But
this seems to put the cart before the horse, for it assumes that in order to know such
ordinary modal facts like “it is possible to break a teacup” or scientific modal claims
like “superluminal signaling is impossible”, we would need a metaphysical account
of the relevant aspects of the world.3 Now, it seems clear that we do have modal
knowledge about ordinary and scientific matters. But, as the disagreements in recent
epistemology of modality attest (e.g., Priest, 2021;Wang, 2021), it is far less clear that
we possess the required kind of metaphysical knowledge.4 One might point out that
many of these metaphysical approaches aim at giving an account of our knowledge
of metaphysical modality, and, due to this, they are distinct from theories concerning
natural modalities. Though there is some truth in this, the issue is not so simple.
For instance, metaphysicians usually take metaphysical necessity to be stronger than
natural necessity. Therefore, if something is metaphysically necessary, then it is also
2 Shoemaker (1998) argues that physical and metaphysical modalities coincide, and the proponents
of nomological necessitarianism—like Armstrong (2010), Latham (2011), Maudlin (2007), and Psillos
(2009)—suggest that natural laws are metaphysically necessary.
3 Optionally one could fully separate epistemological questions about natural modalities from those con-
cerning metaphysical modalities, thus rendering said metaphysical questions irrelevant for scientific and
everyday matters.
4 Roca-Royes makes a somewhat similar statement. According to her, we possess the modal knowledge
that the wooden table in her office can break. But it is not at all as clear that we have knowledge of what
properties, if any, are essential to it. (Roca-Royes, 2017, p. 223.).
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naturally necessary. (See, e.g., Williamson, 2016.) Thus, it is not possible to handle
these two fields of modality as being completely separate.
To be fair, there have also been views on the epistemology of modality that take a
more neutral approach (e.g., Bueno & Shalkowski, 2015; Fischer, 2016, 2017; Roca-
Royes, 2017). Several contributions have also taken scientific results and practices
seriously. For example, in his recent paper “Modality as a Subject for Science”,
Williamson (2017) discusses scientific modalities at some length. However, his main
motivation is to study scientific modality to learn new insights about the limitation
and problematic nature of metaphysical modality. We agree with Williamson on the
importance of science when it comes to evaluating modal claims. However, we do
not presume any privileged metaphysical domain that we want to learn more about.
Rather, we want to look for the kinds of modal claims that are actually being made in
the sciences and give our best epistemic account for them.
As a pragmatic first approximation, we think the goal of scientific modal inferences
is most naturally couched out in terms of natural objective modalities. However, we do
not want tomake any far-reaching assumptions about the nature of this domain beyond
what is revealed to us by science itself. Of course, science ultimately is an epistemic
enterprise, and our access to objective modal facts happens through epistemic means.
As said, we think the justification for distinguishing between objective and epistemic
modalities is pragmatic. As such, we do not demand that there needs to be some
deep philosophical gulf between these, even if their respective formal apparati differ.
Neither do we rule out any other options for modal targets apriori. In fact, a case can
be made easily to include also pure logical modality which is often treated as its own
separate category. As a branch of science, formal logic seems the best discipline to
deal with this area of modality.
Epistemologies of modality have usually been divided between rationalist (or a pri-
ori) and empiricist (or a posteriori) approaches. Of the two, rationalist epistemologies
have thus far been vastly more popular (for references, see, e.g., Roca-Royes, 2017;
Tahko, 2017). Our view exemplifies both of these stances. We build on and contrast
our argument especially with those of Roca-Royes (2017), Bueno and Shalkowski
(2015), and Fischer (2016, 2017), since these seem to come closest to our own views.
We present two parallel epistemologies for making inferences about modalities that
exhibit predominantly a priori and a posteriori elements, respectively. However, this
seemingly non-uniform epistemic architecture (see Mallozzi, 2021b) is later system-
atized aswe showhow these two routes are often importantly connectedwhen scientists
make modal inferences.
3 Actualist-manipulationist modal inferences
We will start with a way of making modal inferences that is based on actuality. These
kinds ofmodal inferences aremainly a posteriori. This formofmodal inferring is based
on the actuality-to-possibility principle,which is exceptionallywidely accepted among
philosophers (Hanrahan, 2017; Vaidya, 2015). The idea is that what is actual is also
possible. For if it were impossible, it would not be actual in the first place.However, one
shouldnote that this only allows for inferences about possibilities—andactualizedones
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at that. Nevertheless, we claim that the actuality-to-possibility principle also enables
making inferences of other modal categories, like necessities and contingencies.
Bueno and Shalkowski (2015, p. 678) claim that the actuality-to-possibility princi-
ple is based on another more elementary epistemic principle. According to it, grounds
for justifying some claim are sufficient for justifying another weaker claim that the
stronger claim entails. Because any claim, say “p”, is stronger than the claim “p is
possible” in the sense that p entails ♦p, any grounds for justifying “p” suffice for
justifying “p is possible”. Since Bueno and Shalkowski (2015, p. 678) treat relative
weakness informally, it is difficult to saywhat this epistemic principle exactly amounts
to.5 In principle, we do not have huge problems with it, but we think it is more than
is needed. Instead, we propose that the actuality-to-possibility principle is best under-
stood as a semantic or linguistic one: it describes certain uses of the words “actual” and
“possible” in English and in other languages, including formal languages, that contain
the same or similar predicates. This comes close to the idea of modal normativism,
which “sees the basic function of modal discourse as giving us perspicuous ways of
conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules” (Thomasson, 2021). It
is also important to note that sometimes the word “possibility” is not even used in
this fashion. Instead, it might refer to something like non-actualized potentiality. This
naturally affects the validity of the inference from “p” to “p is possible” because when
something is actual, it is no longer a non-actualized potentiality. Opting one or the
other of these usages seems to be a pragmatic choice.6
How is the actuality-to-possibility principle applied in practice? Oneway of finding
out whether something is contingent is by observing that it and its negation have both
been actualized. For instance, it was contingent that a teacup was located at a corner
of a desk. This can be inferred from the fact that it is now located in another place.7
Again this only tells of actualized contingencies. As an example, most are inclined
to accept it as in some sense contingent that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo.
However, since Napoleon never actually won the battle, this method by itself does
not allow us to infer that his defeat was contingent. And the same problem emerges
even worse when it comes to necessity and impossibility since one cannot directly see
whether something is necessary or impossible. So, pure appeal to actuality does not
exhaust our knowledge of modalities—something more is needed.
Roca-Royes (2017) has argued that we can obtain modal knowledge of non-
actualized possibilities by inductive inference (see also Hawke, 2011; Leon, 2017).
5 Indeed, the weakness of the claims seems to be either irrelevant or redundant here as long as we know
that p entails ♦p. For example, one could think that ♦q is also informally weaker than p, but this would not
mean that p entails ♦q. Also, any proposition entails itself, so strict weakness is not required anyway.
6 Vetter (2020) has recently written about non-actualized potentiality. Though she does not approach it
from a semantic perspective, as we do here, but, instead, form a metaphysical one.
7 According to necessitarianism all truths are necessarily true (Lin, 2012, p. 418). So, whatever happens
at any given time is necessary, and, a fortiori, it was necessary that the teacup was located at the corner
of the desk at that specific time. Now, of course, the fact that the cup was moved is not yet proof that
necessitarianism is false. However, it does show that it was not necessary for the teacup to be always
located at that place. For it was possible for the teacup to be at one place and later at another. This is the
kind of knowledge of natural or empirical possibility that one can achieve with the actuality-to-possibility




Her view is roughly the following: one can make generalizations of actualized de re
possibilities to other similar entities. Take a teacup. If a given teacup is shattered, it
is possible for it to shatter. Now, another teacup is similar to the shattered one, and
thus we reason that it is possible for it too to shatter. Roca-Royes’ model is open to
an objection: did we make the correct generalizations from appropriate similarities?
What if we had inferred from the fact that the teacup is white, the general claim that it
is possible for all white objects to shatter?8 But this is just the problem of induction.
One would hope that giving a satisfactory epistemology of modal inferences does not
require one to solve that as well.9 Still, there are better and worse cases of induction,
and it would behoove us to say something about how to go about making better induc-
tive generalizations. This is where empirical testing comes to play. We can test the
shatterability of white objects by, for instance, painting objects known not to shatter
white in order to see whether whiteness was the key to shatterability. Similarly, we
can do tests on the shapes and materials of objects to see which of these, if any, have
an impact on the possibility of them shattering.10 So, our inductive generalizations are
often based on the method of trial and error, at least at the beginning of the inquiry.
There is no need to talk about essences since they (if there are any) need not be in play
at the practical level. In the case of the teacups, no assumption of a shared essence
was made. What was enough was to pick any similarity, then make predictions, and
then test them. Note, however, that we do not deny that there are essences. Essences
may or may not exist. We merely point out that one does not need to know that those
properties, which render teacups shatterable, are essential to them. It is sufficient that
teacups simply have those properties.
Thus far, we have only dealt with possibility and contingency.What about necessity
and impossibility? That something is actual does not, in itself, tell us that it is necessary.
By the same token, that something is not actual, and has not yet been actualized, is not
a sufficient reason to think that it is impossible. We suggest that one may bridge the
gap between the actual and the necessary (or the non-actual and the impossible) by
employing manipulations.11 This means that in order to find out whether something,
say X, is necessary, through empirical means, one must try to bring about a state of
affairs where X is not the case. This is based on the idea that if something is necessary,
then nomanipulation can change it.While trying to realize not-X, one often should try a
variety of different manipulations in order to avoid too hasty inductive generalizations.
Impossibility is merely a flipside of the same coin: if something is impossible, then its
negation is necessary. Thus, no manipulation can actualize that which is impossible.
8 We are grateful to Sanna Mattila for pointing out this possibility of error.
9 Whether our inductive generalizations are good is something we learn through bitter experience and not
by first having the metaphysical structure of the world in hand (see Ladyman & Ross, 2007, p. 106). If one
starts as a sceptic regarding induction, one will be hard-pressed to ever get to a place where one could let
go of such skepticism.
10 Note that we have not given an analysis of the disposition shatterable but merely a way of figuring out
whether an object is shatterable. Since this is the case, we need not take any sides in metaphysical debates
about the nature of dispositions, such as whether they are “single-track” or “multi-track” dispositions, what
their specificity or context-dependence is, and so on (see, e.g., Vetter, 2015, ch. 2).
11 We use a non-anthropocentric notion of manipulation that is not tied to the intentions of human agents
(see, e.g., Woodward, 2003, pp. 103–104). We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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As a toy example, think of a situation where one is trying to figure out whether
an object is breakable or not, that is, whether it is possible or impossible to break
it. (Remember that if it is impossible to break the object, then it necessarily remains
intact.) One could go about this task by attempting a number of manipulations aimed
at breaking the object: smashing it, asking others to help destroy it, using machines
or explosives, coloring it white (recall the teacup), and so on. If such manipulations
fail to break the object, one can make the ampliative inference that it is impossible to
break it. To be sure, this conclusion is fallible. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to say that
such attempted manipulations would give us information about the modal properties
of the given state of affairs. In fact, this is how necessity or impossibility claims are
often made in science, as we will show in this and the next two sections.
Let us take stock of what has been thus far established about the actualist-
manipulationist account. AM inferences can give us knowledge of natural or empirical
modalities. Therefore, it does not, for instance, offer information concerning meta-
physical modalities—if they are separate from natural modality. To put it explicitly, X
is.
(1) possible, iff X has been actualised,
(2) necessary, iff no manipulation can alter X,
(3) impossible, iff no manipulation can realize X, and
(4) contingent, iff X and not-X have both been actualised.
Using Roca-Royesian inferences from similarities, one is able to extend inferences
obtained about necessity and impossibility in singular cases—cases like the breaka-
bility of an object in our toy example—to other situations that are relevantly similar.
Hence, assume that we encounter another object, similar to the unbreakable one, and
we wonder whether that too has the same modal properties. Still, we are unwilling to
try all the same manipulations as we did before. (Perhaps we are exhausted from our
previous efforts or simply out of white paint.) Here, however, we have another option.
We can simply observe the properties of the two objects and see if they are similar in
some way that distinguishes both of them from objects that are known to break.
At this point, it is good to note a few things concerning our concept of manipulation.
First, thisway of gaining knowledge on necessity and impossibility is not a reductionist
one since “manipulation” is arguably an implicit modal concept. After all, on the one
hand, the very idea of manipulation implies the possibility of change, and, on the other,
the idea that something might resist our manipulations implies that change might be
impossible. Hence, we are not offering a reductionist analysis of modal knowledge.
Second, manipulations need not be made by humans. So, for instance, a meteor hitting
an object and not breaking it will support our inference that it is impossible to break.12
Manipulations are a principal tool for making modal inferences in science. This
is not always straightforward, as the experiments they constitute are often riddled
with uncertainties and underdetermined options for inference-making. However, being
related by definitional stipulations, modal notions provide interconnected inferential
12 Woodward has made a similar concession regarding his theory of causal explanation. He uses in his
analysis the concept of manipulation, which is a causal concept, and hence his account is likewise non-
reductionist (Woodward, 2003, p. 21).
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avenues that are simple to navigate conceptually. Friedrich Wöhler’s (1828) synthe-
sis of ammonium cyanate into urea showed that it is possible to synthesize organic
molecules in an inorganic way (Wöhler, 1828). Going by the actuality-to-possibility
principle, Wöhler could deductively show only the possibility of the token instances
of molecules that he actually managed to produce. However, because his experiment
was in the context of a larger scientific debate, the result could be used as an argument
against vitalism: to show that living systems were not necessary to produce organic
matter. Thus, it concerned not only the possible existence of a particular instance
of molecules but rather the possible types of producing them. If we assume that the
experiment itself was conducted and recorded successfully and grant a suitably strong
empirical formulation of the principle of élan vital, this inference against vitalism
is logically valid even without further ampliative resources. Contrary to widely held
belief, however, it also took further experiments, like Kolbe’s 1845 conversion of car-
bon disulfide to acetic acid, to convince the opposing camp of the robustness of the
possibility of inorganic-to-organic transformations. This was because there were cer-
tain unclarities regarding the origin of Wöhlers’s substances, more precisely whether
they could be regarded as purely inorganic or not (Toby, 2000). What kinds of modal
inferences a manipulation allows for beyond token actuality-to-possibility claims—its
larger “modal extent”—is typically context-sensitive and not reducible to any single
element of the test-setting.
It is worth noting that the actualist-manipulationist account of modal inferences
can also account for counterfactual inferences. To see this, suppose that we do some
manipulations and find, say, that if we bring about X, then Y follows. This not only
allows for the inference that X and Y are possible, but also that if X would be the
case, then Y would also be the case, a counterfactual inference. Let us take a simple
example. In August 1928, physician Alexander Fleming left some bacterial samples
in his laboratory before leaving for a vacation. Upon his return, Fleming noticed that
one of the culture plates had been left open. It was infested with mould, and bacteria
would not grow around the mould. This discovery eventually led to the development
of penicillin. (Arseculeratne & Arseculeratne, 2017.) Based on the anecdote, one can
formulate the following simple counterfactual: “If themouldPenicillium rubenswould
be added to a Petri dish, then a number of bacteria would not grow in proximity to
the fungus.”13 Here we can see that empirical observation can license a counterfactual
inference.
There is nothing surprising here. Indeed if we accept a counterfactual theory of
causal explanation, the very possibility of manipulation will entail a counterfactual
inference, as shown by Pearl (2009) and Woodward (2003). After all, a counterfac-
tual theory of causal explanation is built upon the idea that the information required
in causal explanation is counterfactual and can be discovered through manipulation-
s—even when actual manipulations are not viable (Woodward, 2003, pp. 10–11).
The actualist-manipulationist account of making modal inferences is able to give
information only about empirical or natural modalities. That is, they only tell us
about the modalities of the real or actual world. This means that modal claims further
13 Penicillin was actually discovered already before Fleming, but the earlier discoveries had been forgotten
(Arseculeratne & Arseculeratne, 2017). In addition, Fleming erroneously thought that the mould he had
discovered was Penicillium rubrum when, in fact, it was Penicillium rubens (Houbraken et al., 2011).
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removed from empirical access, like perhaps those concerning metaphysical modality,
are not amicable to this type of treatment. For such claims, a different approach is
needed.
Although we are discussing empirical modalities, the actualist-manipulationist
approach is not fully a posteriori, except when dealing with actualized possibilities
and contingencies. Some kind of ampliative inference, either inductive or abduc-
tive, is required when making generalizations or using manipulations to gain new
modal knowledge. The ampliative inferences add a non-empirical component to this
approach. Hence, even though the account is largely empirical or a posteriori, it is not
without an a priori or rationalistic component—albeit a minor one.
Finally, the ampliative inferences that the actualist-manipulationist view rests on
can be pre-theoretical. That is, they do not require any prior theory but can simply
be a matter of ‘pure’ empirical observations. Of course, there are popular claims that
all our observations are theory-laden14 but, for our purposes, it is sufficient that pre-
theoretical thinking is possible, not that it is, in fact, common. Let us note that, given
our evolutionary origins, there must have been a time when there were no scientific
theories, even if simply for the fact that there was no language.
4 Relative modality and inference-making
Another way of making inferences about modalities is based on relative modality
(RM) (cf. Quine, 1982, p. 121; Melia, 2003, pp. 15–18; Girle, 2003, pp. 96–97). The
conception of relative modality is an old one, but curiously enough, it is given very
little attention in the current literature on modalities.15 However, many theories on
the epistemology of modality are implicitly based on it (see, e.g., Williamson, 2007;
Bueno & Shalkowski, 2015; Fischer, 2016, 2017; Pättiniemi et al., forthcoming),
making its proper explication even more important. In addition, the different varieties
of modality—such as logical, metaphysical, epistemic, natural—presuppose RM even
though the term “relative modality” is seldom used (see, e.g., Vaidya, 2015; Kment,
2021b). Also, in the context of the philosophy of physics Maudlin (2020) uses an
approach to modalities that can be seen as a special case of relative modality.16
The idea behind relativemodality is a simple one:modal statements are evaluated
in relation to a system, such as a model or a theory. We then say that given a system
S a statement X is.
(1) possible, iff affirming X does not lead to a contradiction within S,
(2) necessary, iff affirming not-X leads to a contradiction within S,
(3) impossible, iff affirming X leads to a contradiction within S, and
(4) contingent, iff neither affirming X nor not-X leads to a contradiction within
S.
14 For a paradigmatic version of the argument, see Kuhn (1962, pp. 111–123).
15 For example, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not even mention the term and both the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and JosephMelia’smonograph, published as part ofAcumen’sCentral
Problems of Philosophy, only mentions it in passing (Melia, 2003, pp. 15–18).
16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.
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Relative modal statements can be seen as a priori, since their truth-values depend
only on the system chosen and not on what the real world is like. Of course, the reason
why we are dealing with a given system might be that we have a posteriori found it to
be a good one in modelling certain aspects of the world. But it has no bearing on the
relative modalities of the system whether or not this is so.
Roughly, a system can be characterized as what is kept fixed (see, e.g., Quine, 1982;
Williamson, 2007). Quine, for instance, has remarked on the connection between
necessity and fixedness as follows:
Relative to a particular inquiry, some predicatesmay play amore basic role than others,
or may applymore fixedly; and thesemay be treated as essential. [...] [T]he very notion
of necessity makes sense to me only relative to context. Typically it is applied to what
is assumed in an inquiry, as against what has yet to transpire. (Quine, 1982, p. 121.)
Something is fixed if we accept it as an unchanging part of our present inquiry.
Although Quine’s wording seems to imply that he is considering empirical inquiry,
his point can be extended to more rationalistic endeavors.17
One example of a modally apt system is provided by the game of chess. The rules
of chess mark out which moves are in principle possible, contingent, necessary, or
impossible (i.e., according to the rules). The state of play—the specific position of
the pieces—determines which of those moves are in practice possible, contingent,
necessary, or impossible. A systemmight be one where we keep just the rules of chess
fixed or the one where we keep both the rules and the state of play fixed. As an easy
example, it is impossible to start a game of chess by moving the queen. This is because
the queen cannot move through or over the other pieces like a knight can.
The rules of chess, and games in general, are not an empirical matter pertaining
to natural modalities. They are not based on empirical discoveries, except perhaps
findings about what kinds of games human beings have an interest in playing. This
again demonstrates that relative modality is only indirectly empirical, if empirical at
all. Of course, someone who does not know the rules can learn them by following a
number of chess games or trying to play against amore knowledgeable opponent, like a
computer. However, this would fall under actualist-manipulationist modal inferences,
even if on its basis, one would formulate a theory of the game’s relative modalities.
Bob Fischer’s “theory-based modal epistemology” (Fischer, 2016, 2017) comes
close to our conception of RM. In Fischer’s view, one is justified in believing a modal
claim if one believes the claim based on a theory, according to which the claim is true,
andone is justified in believing the theory (Fischer, 2017, p. 17).Despite the similarities
with our and Fischer’s positions, he makes several additional assumptions, including
the requirement of mind-independent scientific realism (Fischer, 2016, 2017, pp. 5–6),
which we consider unnecessary. Our view of RM would, in principle, be acceptable
both to him and to an empiricist, like Bueno or van Fraassen. Fischer also states that
imprecise and non-explicit mental models are sufficient for justifying modal claims
(Fischer, 2016, 2017, pp. 25–27).We, in contrast, insist that a justifiedmodal inference
has to be explicated: one needs to argue that affirming something within some system
17 It is also good to note that Quine rejects absolute or objective necessity (see, e.g., Quine, 1966). Divers
(2018) offers some discussion and references.
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does or does not cause a contradiction in it.18 After all, our beliefs concerning systems,
like theories or games, and their implications can be mistaken.
In contrast to chess, a scientificmodel or theory is based on empirical research.As an
example, the special theoryof relativity is derived fromempirical findings in addition to
formal considerations. It can be used to determine the impossibility of superluminal
travel within the system.19 By adding background assumptions (initial conditions,
etc.), predictions about more specific situations can be derived from scientific models
or theories.20 This is analogical with keeping a certain state of play fixed in chess. So,
from the general theory of relativity, one can calculate the possible trajectories of a
comet, given its initial state. The number of possible trajectories will depend on how
little the initial conditions are allowed to vary.
Maudlin’s (2020) view of physical modalities is very much in line with the pre-
ceding paragraph, though limited to physical theories, or rather “laws”, which he
takes to be “[t]he fundamental concept in contemporary physics” (Maudlin, 2020,
p. 524). Maudlin thinks, as do we, that given the equations of physics, we can almost
trivially make modal inferences through varying boundary conditions, initial values,
and so on. As he states, “[a]ll one does is treat the set of mathematical models of
the basic dynamical equations as the ‘possible worlds’ in standard modal semantics”
(Maudlin, 2020, p. 525). There are, however, important differences between our RM
and Maudlin’s view. First, RM can be used whenever we have a system to base it on,
not only in physics. Second, we need not, as Maudlin does (Maudlin, 2020, p. 523,
528), commit to any ontology of a system under study: we see no need to take “laws”
as a “fundamental concept” in order to make modal inferences.
Getting back on track, let us take a more substantial example frommodern physics.
An important result in the foundations of quantum mechanics is a purely formal
result dealing with the structure of quantum mechanics: the Kochen–Specker theo-
rem (Kochen & Specker, 1967). The theorem starts with two premises which can be
characterized in the following way.21 The first premise states that the statistical prop-
erties of quantum mechanics have to be replicated. The second premise states that
all observables in the theory can be assigned definite values without any reference
18 Due to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, it is, of course, a known fact that sufficiently strong formal
systems cannot prove all of their truths. However, whether we are talking about semantic or syntactic
consequence, we take it that these depend on the features of the system and logic in question and not on,
say, the intuitions of human investigators. Specifying the system carefully is thus extremely important.
Besides providing enriched inferential tools, one purpose of RM is to represent modal information that is
publicly evaluable. Some statements in RM may also remain undetermined, but this is not a feature unique
to modalities.
19 The mathematics of special relativity alone cannot establish this. One needs to add further constraints to
keep the results ‘physical’. One such requirement is for all magnitudes to have values that are real numbers.
20 This does not seem to suffice for Fischer (2016, 2017, p. 22). According to him, an epistemology
of modality is insufficient if it merely grants us the ability to make empirical predictions. As a realist,
he thinks that explanations are also required and, in order to explain, a theory needs to be true in some
deep metaphysical sense. Our view does not make such prerequisites, and, following Woodward (2003,
pp. 10–12), we think that prediction and explanation are often (though not always) different sides of the
same coin.




to a measurement context. That is, all the properties of a quantum object22 will have
well-defined values in all contexts. These two premises taken together lead to a con-
tradiction, as shown by Kochen and Specker (1967) among others (see, e.g., Peres,
1991; Kernaghan, 1994; Cabello et al., 1996). The first premise might seem trivial,
but it gives the theorem its bite; it makes clear that the theorem restricts any theory
that aims to replicate the empirical structure of quantum mechanics. So, the upshot of
the theorem is that any ‘hidden-variable’ replacement for quantum mechanics “which
would attribute a definite result to each quantum measurement, and still reproduce the
statistical properties of quantum theory, must necessarily be contextual” (Peres, 1991,
p. L175). Thus, here we have an inference to a necessity in quantum mechanics. But
what does ‘contextual’ mean in this context? In short, it means that for any three oper-
ators (corresponding to observables of a quantum object) A, B and C such that [A, B]
= [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] = 0, the result of the measurement of A depends on whether
A is measured alone or together with either B or C (Peres, 1991, p. L175). So, it is only
possible to assign determinate values to observables if a measurement context is also
provided. This gives a powerful constraint on the space of possibilities in quantum
theories. Of note here is that both the inference of a necessity as well a possibility
in the context of science—theoretical physics in this instance—is conditional on the
system used.
Things are not always as apt for formal treatment as in the case of chess or physics.
However, this does not mean that RM would be irrelevant in these cases. Indeed,
it might still be our best way to make modal inferences, as manipulations might
sometimes be out of the question. Let us consider two historical claims as examples:
(1) Napoleon could have won atWaterloo, and, therefore, it is contingent that he lost.
(2) The use of nuclear weapons was impossible during the Battle of Waterloo.
Both of these seem quite plausible, but let us try to flesh out how to deal with
them using RM. In order to justify the claim that Napoleon’s loss at Waterloo was
contingent, we need to allow at least some counterfactuals. For if we keep everything
fixed, the end result would also be fixed, which implies that Napoleon’s defeat was
necessary after all.23 So, one might argue, relative to a system where the number of
troops, weather conditions, and so on are kept fixed, but allowing for Napoleon having
anticipated for Blücher’s actions better, commencing the battle earlier, and instructing
marshal Grouchy more effectively, and so on he could have won the battle (Schom,
1992, pp. 266–267).
For the second claim—the use of nuclear weapons was not possible during the
Battle of Waterloo (in 1815)—what is kept fixed is again what matters. One would
need to allow for the discovery of pure uranium to have happened several decades
before it did (uranium was discovered in 1789 but isolated for the first time in 1841),
for the discovery of radioactivity (actually discovered by Beqcuerell in 1896) and
the special theory of relativity (discovered by Einstein in 1905) almost a century
before, and not to mention quantum mechanical atomic theory over a century before
22 Here the word “system” would be better, but we opt for “object” in order not to cause confusion with
the system(s) used in RM.
23 This is exactly what a necessitarianist would do. Indeed, necessitarianism can be understood through
RM as the metaphysical position that keeps all past, present, and future states fixed.
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(the Rutherford–Bohr model for the hydrogen atom is from 1913, but a more final
quantum theory is that due to Schrödinger and Heisenberg is from 1925), and in
addition huge advancements in material technology, instrumentation, and so on would
have needed to happen much earlier. Historians are usually not willing to make such
drastic counterfactual changes to history. The alterations required to make Napoleon’s
loss contingent are considerably lesser than those required for the use of nuclear
weaponry at the same battle. In fact, it is quite difficult to say what historical facts
could be kept fixed if one allows the use of atomic bombs at 19th-century battles as a
possibility.
From the two examples of Napoleon’s possible victory atWaterloo and the possible
trajectories of a comet, we can see how counterfactuals can be evaluated in RM. A
comet has, as amatter of fact, a single well-defined trajectory. But the general theory of
relativity allows for other trajectories if we allow the initial conditions to vary. Building
on this, we can now make the counterfactual statement C: “given the velocity v of the
comet X, had its angle of entry to our solar system been θ ’, instead of θ , X would have
hit the Earth”. So, our system SC is now: general relativity + initial conditions of the
actual case, except θ ’ is swapped for θ . How is one to determine if C is true or not?
We do the appropriate calculation and find out whether X hits the Earth in SC or does
not. If it does, then C is true. If not, then C is false. So, we have a way of evaluating
counterfactuals relative to a system.24
Williamson’s epistemology of modality is based on our ability to evaluate counter-
factual conditionals while keeping some “constitutive facts” fixed (Williamson, 2007,
p. 164, 170). Despite his emphasis on counterfactuals, in practice,Williamson’s theory
is based on relative modality with an absolutist twist: some things should always be
kept fixed. However, Williamson does not inform his reader how one can know which
facts or matters are to be taken as constitutive and why (Fischer, 2016; Roca-Royes,
2011). In our view, there is no need to talk about constitutivity. What should be fixed
depends on the purpose of the system. RMhas the benefit that it enables us to represent
the division between different modal spheres as simply concerning what we decide
to keep fixed in our systems at a given time. Natural modalities, for instance, encom-
pass modalities that have been fixed employing the actuality-to-possibility principle,
manipulations, and the relative modalities of our scientific systems. Metaphysical
modalities concern relative modalities in metaphysical systems.25,26 Logical modal-
ities concern the relative modalities in a system of logic that we have chosen based
on the axioms of that logic. Finally, epistemic modalities concern that which can and
cannot be ruled out from our or some other epistemic situation or point of view.
24 The case with Napoleon will be trickier to figure out in practice, and any answer given will probably be
subject to controversy. Nevertheless, the same principle can be applied.
25 Clarke-Doane (2019) seems to be in agreement with us that metaphysical modality is not absolute, but
rather than going the strict RM route, he takes “possibility” and “necessity” to fall under several differing
conceptions, none of which are more absolute than the others.
26 According to our relative modality account, metaphysical modalities are determined by what is fixed in
a metaphysical system. Leech (2011) argues that metaphysical necessity can be cashed out through relative
modality. Although we are not ready to accept Leech’s program as a whole, we think that it shows promise.
Fischer (2016) also hints at a similar approach.
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One might worry whether we are implicitly giving logic a fundamental status.
Given our way of evaluating modal statements presented at the beginning of this
section, which rests on contradictions and negations, do we not have to specify a logic
and stick to it? Simply put: no, we need not. Classical logic with contradiction and
negation simply gives us a convenient metalanguage to talk about various systems
with modal operations, and we will only be committed to a given logic insofar as it
suits us in achieving whatever goals we may have. So, it is true that a logic is needed,
but we may choose to use whichever logic we find convenient for a given task. Hence,
the choice of which logic to use—to the extent that we are actually at all able to choose
between logics—is in our view a pragmatic one. Of course, one must always start with
some system of inference, but we see no reason why some of its rules could not be
relaxed and new ones fixed gradually. For example, because intuitionistic logic does
not have a duality between the quantifiers ∀ and ∃, its resulting modal extension means
losing duality between the modal operators  and ♦.
A particularly interesting challenge to our view might be offered by dialetheism,
which states there are true dialetheias, true contradictions. Now certainly, if some con-
tradictions are true, then they also have to be possible. This flies right at the face of our
relative definition of possibility, based on the Aristotelian Law of Non-Contradiction.
As Bueno and Shalkowski (2015, p. 682) note, modal operators ultimately depend on
the consequence relation of the assumed background logic. As there are different ways
to construct logics that wind up having different kinds of consequence relations, one
cannot definemodal operators simpliciter, but only in relation to a system of logic. This
is totally fine and in line with our account of RM. It is simply a case of higher-order
relativity, where the interpretations of the rules for the modal operators themselves are
also newly relativized.
Thus, in the case of radically different kinds of logics, like paraconsistent logic, there
might be a need to reconsider how the basic modal operations are understood. In these
kinds of situations, however, it might also be questioned whether we are talking about
the same notion of possibility anymore. If negation does not behave like negation, is it
really negation? The same can be asked in the context of modal operators. Ultimately,
however, for our purposes, it is enough that the resulting system is not formally trivial
and that the newly defined modalities bear some inferential relationship to the system
features.27 However, to keep the connection to a common subjectmatter and especially
the scientific practice of making modal inferences, we employ the heuristic of sticking
to a reasonable family resemblance between our metalanguage and modalities as they
are typically conceived in natural languages. Unlike modalists, such as Bueno and
Shalkowski (2015), we do not need to take any notion of modality as primitive, save
for this pragmatic usage of modal terms in ordinary and scientific discourse.
27 Given an arbitrary logic L and a system S, we could define ♦A as such that the assertion of A in S does
not trivialize S (i.e., does not L-entail its every state or well-formed formula). In the case of necessities of
the form A, in turn, A could be a fixed assumption of S or an L-truth, etc. Bueno and Shalkowski (2015)
seem to be sympathetic to this kind of treatment of relative modalities.
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5 The relationship between the two epistemologies
We have presented two epistemologies for justifying modal inferences, actualist-
manipulationist (AM) and relative modality (RM). The obvious question then is: how,
if at all, are these two ways related to each other? Recall that AM is mainly a poste-
riori and RM is mainly a priori. Let us try to bridge the gap from both sides. On the
one hand, starting with pre-theoretical ampliative inferences, we can begin to build
theories that explain our generalizations. These theories, in turn, can be thought of as
systems in the sense of RM. So, we build an empirically adequate model of a situation
and then try to figure out its modal structure using relative modalities.
On the other hand, we can start with a system and use it to model a given
phenomenon. Then we can derive from the system modal claims concerning the phe-
nomenon and see whether they match up with our empirical findings. A system that
has been found adequate can then be used as a basis for ampliative generalizations
in the AM way. Moreover, the modal claims inferred from a system can be empiri-
cally tested by using the AM methodology, like experiments, interventions, and even
chemical or biological synthesis (for an example of the latter, see Koskinen, 2017). In
a word, we can use both approaches to study the same modal phenomena in the world.
It is very rarely the case these days that we start from a purely pre-theoretical
position. Our ampliative inferences rest on all sorts of theories about the way things are
and behave. These theories might be folk theories, philosophical theories, theological
theories, or scientific theories, and they may or may not be reliable.Whatever the case,
they shape the way we form our inductive generalizations by shaping what kinds of
manipulations we take to be feasible and what types of similarities we find relevant.
Here, however, we will focus our attention on scientific theories.
The progress of science has given us a plethora of reliable ways for making good
inductive generalizations. For instance, if we know the number of valence electrons a
chemical element has, we can predict its chemical properties and vice versa. Many if
not all of these properties will be modal properties: such as the possibility (or impossi-
bility) of forming covalent bonds. This example from chemistry illustrates that we are
dealing here with a mixed model of modalities—when reasoning from the number of
valence electrons to chemical properties, we are using RM, and when reasoning from
chemical properties to the number of valence electrons, we are making an inductive
inference, informed by theory, from our empirical observations. More generally: We
make predictions about modal properties of empirical reality based on our theories and
relative modality. We also make inferences about the modal properties of empirical
reality by making observations and manipulations. In addition, we build and correct
our theories based on their results. This interplay between RM and AM grants us most
of our current modal knowledge—if not, indeed, our scientific knowledge in general.
One might be inclined to think that AM merely enables us to fix things in our
systems, and, fair enough, this is an important way in which AM inferences are used.
However, this is true only when we are dealing with impossibilities and necessities,
that is, when no manipulation can alter or actualize something. But when AM informs
us about a possibility or a contingency, it does not guide us on what should be fixed
in a given system. It only states that if a system aims to describe natural modalities, it
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should be such that the descriptions of actualized states do not cause a contradiction
in it.
Another way how RM and AM inferences are connected is that counterfactual
claims, which are derivable from a system, can be tested by manipulations—given
that the system in question aims to describe empirical matters. Take a simple example.
A system S aims to describe under which circumstances objects fall over, and the
following counterfactual claim can be derived from the system: “If an object’s center
of mass moves outside of its support, then the object in question will fall over.” Now,
we set out to test the claim. We do this by taking an object and manipulating it so
that its center of mass moves outside of its support. If the object falls over, we can
infer that S is an adequate model for the phenomenon in question. So, more generally,
one looks for the counterfactual claims derivable from a system and then seeks to do
manipulations in order to show whether or not these counterfactuals turn out to be
empirically supported. Here, the counterfactuals derived from a system can be seen as
predictions that then are tested through manipulations, or even by observations—in
cases where the world is kind enough to supply a change of situations for us.
Moreover, counterfactual claims that have been established through manipulations
trivially contain some modal information that can be used in constructing systems
with empirical targets. In order to empirically justify a counterfactual, say, “If A would
happen, then B would happen,” one would have to actualize A and see if B occurs. If
the manipulation is successful and produces the expected result, then any system that
fulfills the following criteria can adequately model the counterfactual in question:
(1) A and B do not contradict each other,
(2) B is not trivially true in the system, and
(3) if A is fixed in the system, then also B is true in it.
The above considerations shed some light on the interplay between the two ways of
making modal inferences. So, on the one hand, we build systems to model empiri-
cal phenomena and look at whether the modal inferences derived from the systems
hold empirically. On the other hand, we make observations and manipulations (and
ampliative generalizations) about different phenomena and use them to build theoret-
ical systems that model these phenomena.
Let us take one more example from science, this time from crystallography. Before
the discovery of “quasicrystals” in 1982 (Shechtman et al., 1984), the receivedwisdom
was that only certain types of point symmetries are possible in crystals. Indeed, the old
view of crystals was that they are composed of a regularly repeating array of atoms.
But another characteristic feature of crystals is that they exhibit a sharp (electron)
diffraction pattern. It was this diffraction pattern that was thought to be possible only
for a regularly repeating array of atoms, but the crystals found by Shechtman, Blech,
Gratias, and Cahn had amore complex point symmetry than that of traditional crystals,
one that did not compose of a regularly repeating pattern, but a rather more complex
symmetry of the icosahedral group m35. So, here a theoretical impossibility was
shown to be false by empirical means—an inference of possibility from actuality. But,
naturally, the initial theoretical claim had been derived from a theory supported and
inspired by empirical work on crystals.
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Each and every modal claim derived from a given system can also be used as a fal-
sifier for that system if the system aims to describe the observable world. For instance,
according to the special theory of relativity, superluminal signaling is impossible. But
if someone were able to transmit information at a velocity that exceeds the speed
of light, this would seriously question the validity of the system, namely the special
theory of relativity.28
6 Conclusions
We have presented in this paper a two-pronged epistemology of modal inferences, one
based on an actualist-manipulationist (AM) method and the other on relative modal-
ity (RM). We argued that these methods can accommodate our scientific inferences,
especially when used in combination.
These routes of making modal inferences are neutral with respect to metaphysical
accounts on why the claims in question are correct—be it due to essences or some
other metaphysical foundation. Hence, if there are several competing metaphysical
explanations for an empirically discovered modal fact, these methods support all of
them equally. In otherwords, themethods are unable to pick out, nor do they require the
correct metaphysical account, even if there is one. Indeed, the metaphysical ground of
modality remains totally untouched, and we are even willing to go as far as to declare
that any additional metaphysics is not needed for making empirically-based modal
claims. Despite this, it seems to give us modal knowledge, though it clearly is fallible.
We think one of the strengths of our account is that it does not draw a deep divi-
sion between modal and non-modal aspects of scientific reasoning. As our examples
demonstrate, scientific inferences typically are modal inferences. We often start from
what is actual and work our way from there toward modal facts. However, sometimes
the converse is the case. We might have scientifically justified knowledge about what
is possible or necessary without having a clear picture of the actual situation or an
infallible grasp of an underlying, fundamental metaphysical truth. Depending on the
situation, modal inferences can be tools to learn new things about what is actual,
or the conclusion of modal inference can be the goal of inquiry by itself. The two
epistemologies presented in this paper are designed to account for both of these roles.
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